This appendix reports several key aspects of our data collection, coding, summary statistics and spatial analysis. First, it summarizes how we collected information about district (LC5) elections and the composition of local-level resource allocation committees-District Executive Committees (DECs)-in order to measure key variables in our empirical analyses. Second, it describes the coding of the dependent variable. Third, it provides summary statistics for all variables used in our analyses. Fourth, it provides further information on the copula-based binary logit choice model we use for accommodating spatial correlation across observational units. Specifically it provides a formalization of the homoskedastic version of the Bhat and Sener likelihood function. Fifth, it provides additional information on the robustness checks.
inter-election period and data on district chairperson elections. 1 We hired a team of Ugandan research assistants to collect these data. The research assistants contacted knowledgeable individuals in each district-typically local journalists, current and former politicians, and current and former civil servants-and asked a series of questions about each inter-election period using a standardized instrument. Most of the information was collected by phone, although on occasion our research assistants travelled or were based outside of Kampala (e.g. in Gulu, Lira, Mityana, Masindi, Tororo, and Yumbe) to meet key informants in person. These data were collected in two rounds: between July 2009 and December 2009 and between April and June 2012. The second round was of data collection was necessary to reduce missingness and to conduct reliability and validity checks for the information assembled in 2009.
For each district, research assistants obtained information from at least two local experts, and if those two peoples' responses contradicted one another, the research assistant contacted two additional people. If three out of the four respondents provided the same information, that information was deemed reliable; if not, the research assistant contacted additional people.
While such reported accounts are not ideal, official records of such information are generally unavailable, which may explain why this is the first decentralization study in Uganda using sub-district data. Further, the information we collected is generally common knowledge within districts-particularly among individuals who served as key informants and those who are politically and socially active in a district's civic affairs. As our paper indicates and our fieldwork in Uganda suggests, inter-county politics is a highly salient local issue, and thus politically-active individuals are aware of details such as the home county of prominent local officials. This may explain why in places where we asked two research assistants to collect the same information independently, we found very high rates of inter-coder reliability.
In order to code a county's share of seats in the DEC, our research assistants asked key informants to name all those who served on the DEC in a given inter-election period, including each member's ethnicity and "home county." We use the term home county rather than county of residence since some officials keep a residence in the district headquarters, while originating from a different, more remote county. The home county of district chairperson candidates is well-known locally, and generally is the area where the candidates' extended family resides. Note that the DEC is typically comprised of between five and seven members.
Dependent Variable Coding
Our key dependent variable (Splinter county) denotes whether county j split to form a new district in electoral wave t; that is, in one of three periods between elections in Uganda (local and presidential elections To determine a county's split status, we used Ugandan news sources (particularly articles from New Vision and Monitor), Statoids, 2 and where discrepancies existed, interviews with local officials from the areas in question and information provided by the Ministry of Local Government.
In most cases, districts were requested by the District Council, approved and announced by the government, and created-meaning a new district headquarters was built and staffed-all within a single interelection period. However, in some cases the requests and central government announcement came before an election, whereas the creation of the district occurred only after the election. This was the case for seven districts whose creation was approved and announced prior to the 2006 elections, but came into being in the months following those elections. 3 In these cases we decided to consider the split as occurring when the new districts were approved and publicly announced by the central government. This is the case because, from a theoretical standpoint, when examining the determinants of district splits, we seek to isolate whether factors (such as the composition of the DEC) that existed during a given inter-election period influence decisions at the local and central government levels regarding district splits in that period-or for electoral variables, whether events in a particular election influence such decisions in the following period. Since it is the decision at the local level to request and approve a new district that interests us, we isolate this decision in coding our dependent variable. As far as we know, there are no cases in which the Ugandan government announced the creation of a district and the district was not created.
2 Available at www.statoids.com 3 These seven districts are Budaka, Bukedea, Bulamogi, Buliisa, Kabula, Kongasis, and Manjiya. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis. 
Descriptive Statistics

Spatial Analysis and Distribution of District Splits
The homoskedastic version of the likelihood in Bhat and Sener, which we used for our spatial robustness check, can be written as
is a parameter that reflects spatial-temporal dependence between counties i and j. The hyperbolic tangent function, tanh, maps its argument from the (−∞, ∞)
interval to the (−1, 1) interval, which is a necessary constraint for this likelihood. D ij is the distance between counties i and j while e ijt , p ijt , f ijt , and s ij are dummy variables indicating whether both i and j are similar "as of" electoral wave t where e ijt is equal to one if both county i and county j were below the median level of economic development during or prior to wave t. Similarly, p ijt equals one if both counties i and j were below the median level of political representation during or prior to wave t, while f ijt equals one if county i and j were both ethnically marginalized during or prior to wave t. Finally, s ij indicates whether counties i and j were in the same district at the start of the first inter-election period (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) .
This specification for θ ijt reflects a theory that similarly marginalized counties that are geographically close are more likely to splinter from their districts. The likelihood for a typical logit model is a special case of the above likelihood where γ 1 = γ 2 = γ 3 = γ 4 = 0. The logarithm of this likelihood is maximized subject to the constraint that the term in square brackets is positive. As mentioned above, we find a relatively weak spatial correlation: a likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis that all four gamma coefficients are zero (p-value=0.13). Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
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